weko
Stupid _
weko
[10:26:56] <weko_> Fake floodfill spamming
weko
[10:27:03] <weko_> Floodfills: 7717
weko
[10:32:50] <weko_> zzz: dr|z3d have you floodfill profiling?
weko
[10:33:29] <weko_> Floodfills: 7454
weko
[10:33:29] <weko_> Normal value is 1700-1900
weko
[11:01:08] <weko_> Check stats.i2p...
weko
[10:15:01] <weko_> Attack on the network
weko
[10:15:04] <weko_> Very big
weko
[10:15:14] <weko_> Tunnel creation success rate: 5%
weko
[10:15:14] <weko_> Total tunnel creation success rate: 30%
dr|z3d
now that you mention it, weko, I see a fairly huge spike in ff's.
weko
For now attack eneded
weko
Ended
weko
Floodfills: 1787
dr|z3d
around twice that here.
dr|z3d
let's see if there's anything shared.
weko
Previous attack and current attack?
weko
It is maybe tor attacker. Vort said it is similar to attack for tor, what attacker changing behavior and have some pauses
weko
dr|z3d: have java i2p floodfill profiling?
dr|z3d
what sort of profiling are you thinking?
weko
dr|z3d: alive/dead RI
weko
We shouldnt use floodfill before we verify what RI is alive
weko
I think it is problem in this case
dr|z3d
I don't think the attack's over. Seeing floodfill count increase here.
weko
dr|z3d: in 5 times for several hours?
weko
And go back in 10 minutes?
weko
It is attack, sure.
dr|z3d
haven't been watching, but I'll add some graphs to keep an eye on the count.
weko
See stats.i2p
weko
I seen 7-8k floodfill count, while normal values is 1700-1900. And it is while TCSR is 5%. For now it is 25%
weko
I writed in attack time, but I forgot about _ in nickname
weko
(
weko
wrote*
weko
We need really good profiler and tools for detect such attackers
weko
Torrents been not working, some sites been not working.
weko
It is big issue I think
dr|z3d
sure, it's definitely having an impact.
weko
[12:20:30] <dr|z3d> I don't think the attack's over. Seeing floodfill count increase here.
weko
Oh, I miss understood.
weko
As we can see, different users have different timings in attack ending
weko
For now, have you big now of ff?
weko
num*
dr|z3d
not huge, more than normal. ~2.5K or more, depending on router.
weko
Hm, for me and other in #dev (i2pd), attack ended. But not on the one time
weko
I see big increase of TCSR after ending for me
weko
From 5% to 26%
weko
I think reason is algorithms
weko
Attack again
weko
12k FFs
weko
13... WTF
weko
15k
weko
Tunnel creation success rate: 5%
weko
14k, go back to normal value
orignal
I see 6.5K floodfiils
dr|z3d
If there was any doubt before that the network was under attack, there should be none now.
weko
Sure
zzz
I caught one culprit but I think there's more, gotta tweak my logging and restart
orignal
we need to unserstand if all these new floodfiils are valid
orignal
e.g. their IPs are reachable, they flood and respond to lookups
zzz
they are not responding
orignal
then it's much easier
dr|z3d
yup, that's the problem. just sitting there fielding requests and dropping them.
dr|z3d
hence super low build success.
orignal
zzz they are not respnding to connect or requests?
dr|z3d
lookups, orignal
dr|z3d
auto-session ban for ff's that fail to respond to x queries in y interval?
dr|z3d
or perhaps even better, carry over to next session as per sybils.
orignal
I'm wodering if their IPs are real
orignal
and if they are ipv4 I'm wodering where did they get them from
dr|z3d
could be spoofed addresses, sure, orignal
dr|z3d
a lot of what appeared to be crud ffs weren't resolving via rdns.
orignal
no I mean can you establish NTCP2 session with them?
zzz
gaah NPE in my logging, gotta restart again
zzz
of course I'll work on mitigations but so far java routers seem to be hanging tough
dr|z3d
for some definition of tough. part traffic on usually fast routers taken a dive.
dr|z3d
also seen firewalled router fail to build any tunnels for at least 1/2 hour.
orignal
I don't remeber if I check IP during handshake
orignal
but will add
zzz
both my routers and the network stats look pretty good
dr|z3d
attack wasn't network-wide, seem to hit some routers and not others.
orignal
zzz but number of floodfiils
orignal
what do you see?
zzz
same as what the ilita guys are seeing
zzz
<zzz> NTCP2-only, random IP, cost: 3, XfR, random port
orignal
I'm asking about number of floodfills on your routers
dr|z3d
quantiy?
dr|z3d
*quantity?
orignal
yes
orignal
how many
orignal
we see from 5K to 15K now
orignal
everywhere
zzz
same
orignal
so you do see bucnh of floodfill?
zzz
yes
zzz
same as what the ilita guys are seeing
orignal
so are you able to connect to them with NTCP2?
orignal
e.g. they publish real IP rather than spoofed
zzz
I don't think they are real, but I don't know for sure
orignal
then you should see bunch of connect errors in your log
zzz
I'm working on mitigations while I wait for my logging to kick in
weko
orignal: so, how can I grep my logs for connection errors? Info level
zzz
like I said I caught one culprit, looking for more
dr|z3d
~4K floodfills on a firewalled router.
dr|z3d
10m uptime, 0 services up.
dr|z3d
1% build success.
weko
1800, 6 hours, 18%
dr|z3d
Floodfill Sort
dr|z3d
• Bad: [ZGwjo3] [ZG0tJp] [ZEnMpb] [ZF6Zh0] [ZC~LN5] [ZCxMt3] [ZA3kYm] [ZAqRsL] [ZBBGw7] [ZBF-XD] [ZO~Dp9] [ZOJQf6]
dr|z3d
Floodfill Sort
dr|z3d
• Bad: [CQvRk8] [CQhEJI] [CQ0zzO] [CQecCp] [CQSTN9] [CRv~-w] [CRkRki] [CR4Xwi] [CROpLE] [CS~NYo] [CWsuky] [CWy1vl]
dr|z3d
Floodfill Sort
dr|z3d
• Bad: [94UZxs] [95vw0s] [986cQQ] [99Fqt4] [9zDjws] [91ZCwW] [92Y1GV] [93btJX] [9oxPTN] [9oADSS] [9p027k] [9prluo]
weko
What with first plot
zzz
good news is, we all know what we're doing this week ))
weko
Haha
weko
Vort checked, and found address
weko
0.176.100.180 0.240.43.157 0.98.68.8 127.11.253.126
dr|z3d
all bogons by the looks of things.
weko
zzz: are you checking, what when you make connection in ssu2/ntcp2, peer sending you same IP in RI what it actually have
zzz
no
weko
I think we shoud
zzz
FYI I temporarily shut down stats.i2p
weko
zzz: sorry, I meant "receive connection"
zzz
if peer is firewalled there's no IP in RI
zzz
please give all your ideas to orignal, I don't need any more ideas for Java I2P right now :)
zzz
I've coded about 5 mitigations and working on a few more
weko
zzz: it isn't my idea
weko
It is orignal's idea
weko
zzz: if peer is FW, then we don't connect to peer often
weko
Are you check or no?
zzz
no
zzz
dr|z3d, you have any mitigation code or ideas to contribute?
dr|z3d
increasing isj concurrency, perhaps, might help. could check the build fail rate and increase when super low.
zzz
I'm thinking the opposite.
dr|z3d
could also count consecutive lookup failures from floodfills, and blocklist if they repeatedly fail to respond.
zzz
looking up bad ffs just gets you more bad ffs in the DBSRM
dr|z3d
we've already got hourly/daily success/failure rates for ffs.
zzz
but let me know if you come up with anything
dr|z3d
could do something with those.
dr|z3d
my preference would be for a banlist for repeat non-responders.
dr|z3d
is it worth firing of a periodic ff test on the job queue to validate ffs?
dr|z3d
also, what about introducing a minimum threshold for usage? if the router's not been up/known long enough, just avoid it.
zzz
I have about 7 mitigations coded and in various stages of testing
dr|z3d
ok, when are they likely to land?
zzz
"usage" means what here?
dr|z3d
usage meaning sending requests for RIs or LSs.
dr|z3d
if someone can spin up 4K ff's and the network just blindly starts using them, then we need some speed bumps.
zzz
we have some of that now in FloodfillPeerSelector and that's one of the places I'm tweaking
dr|z3d
ok
zzz
re: land, few days maybe? I want to see where this is headed and also find out if people's routers are OOMing or otherwise dying
zzz
also waiting to see if any of my traps spring
dr|z3d
any value in extending the sybil scan to look at ffs?
zzz
that's all the scan looks at by default
dr|z3d
yeah, but it's just checking for ip ranges right now, no?
zzz
right, it's doing sybil stuff
dr|z3d
and various other attributes, but not success rate of ff replies?
dr|z3d
"hostile router scanner"
zzz
it's not running often enough to be helpful here imho
dr|z3d
anything suspicious about ffs only on ntcp2, no ssu?
zzz
makes it more obvious they're bogus, sure
dr|z3d
seeing a fair few of those here.
obscuratus
Lazy coding, it's easier to spit out fake routers when you only code for one fake transport.
dr|z3d
well, if they _are_ bogus, then what about a simple precondition that ff's need ssu and ntcp enabled?
dr|z3d
easy to avoid them entirely.
obscuratus
Simpler yet, prefer ff's you have actually connected to previously (but we probably already do that to some extent).
obscuratus
I think there are legitimate use cases for NTCP2 only. Some providers block UDP (fewer now than in the past).
dr|z3d
here are a few ntcp only ffs that all conveniently appear consecutively in the netdb I'm looking at:
dr|z3d
tesCZsJ-v1ZNXx7xPTpTWTp1bKyxVgVVf3ix5PTN5~E=
dr|z3d
jGp2Kcv1MpOJmUyfdpP7dl~tsFpjsUKDYPJFE0Rjlu4=
dr|z3d
GDYXNAXE6HZbH80HSVj3ggiUgOeroB14isFVf0vtvxQ=
dr|z3d
kkc2m02ozB6FpgnPMPjFHSrSBZbGcV5JKBH8olbAbPw=
dr|z3d
8k~HA71ZI09WUbWejlw9Sa-4O8D8eUIJ-o0gZdq9t4A=
dr|z3d
that's enough to be going on with.
zzz
don't need a list
dr|z3d
there may well be, obscuratus, but if you're being blocked by your provider, then maybe you shouldn't be running as a ff.
dr|z3d
so preconditions could be checked before consulting a ff, and when enabling in the router.
zzz
just search XfR
dr|z3d
yup.
obscuratus
If all this attacker has to do is expand there code to fake SSU also, we don't acheive that much.
dr|z3d
sure we do, we make it more expensive to run the attack.
dr|z3d
and maybe root out some poorly performing bona fide ffs at the same time.
obscuratus
On the bright side, we held up pretty well. But it does seem like it's been clearly demonstrated to us that spitting out thousands of fake routers (ff or not) is something we have to consider.
zzz
agreed
dr|z3d
for (RouterAddress ra : info.getAddresses()) {
dr|z3d
if (!ra.getTransportStyle().equals("SSU"))
dr|z3d
noSSU = true;
dr|z3d
}
dr|z3d
that's about all that's needed to make sure the ff has SSU, no?
zzz
that has at least two bugs in 4 lines of code
dr|z3d
1 of them being not checking for ssu2, presumably.
zzz
yes
dr|z3d
:)
dr|z3d
the boolean is defined above, but you knew that so I doubt that's bug #2.
zzz
noSSU = true;
zzz
for ...
zzz
if (SSU or SSU2) {
zzz
noSSU = false;
zzz
break;
dr|z3d
I have to do that if I've already specified boolean noSSU = false; above?
dr|z3d
I thought I didn't, and we assume the ff has ssu2 until we check.
zzz
as soon as it hits NTCP2 you're setting noSSU to true
zzz
but I don't think this is a very useful line of defense, as obscuratus points out that's just the symptom du jour
dr|z3d
sure, might not be effective long term, but used with the banlist it'll get a good collection of potentially hostile routers to look at.
orignal
zzz let me explain
orignal
when you receive SessionConfirmed and find an addesss for "s" with valid IP do you compare it with endpoint?
orignal
why NTCP2 only it's obvious
zzz
no we don't
dr|z3d
69 floodfills caught within the first 5m of uptime.
orignal
I remeber you mentioned that you did
orignal
if you don't, may I ask you what's the reason?
orignal
when you receive SessionConfirmed you know enpoint
orignal
and if you peers published an address he is not connected from it means spoofing
zzz
I don't think it's ever been proposed
orignal
I'm going to do it
orignal
any objections or drawbacks?
zzz
it might hurt people using proxies or that just switched their IP... maybe?
zzz
also, I don't think it's going to do anything to fix today's netdb spam
orignal
people using proxies and publishing thier IPs?
orignal
it would
zzz
pretty sure they aren't real routers
orignal
this idiot wouldn't be able to connect to floodfills to publish himself
orignal
do you want me explain how there were created?
zzz
and the one router I think I caught was not publishing an IP
zzz
sure, go ahed
orignal
floodfill not publishing IP? how come?
orignal
I have the parameter host= in config
zzz
tell me your theory, then I'll tell you mine
orignal
the reason of this parameter when you have to use NTCP2-only for some reason
orignal
but know your external IP for some reason
orignal
honestly this parameter was there from days when I didn't have SSU
orignal
but need to oublish NTCP address
orignal
so some idiot from kislitsa has generated bunch of floodfilld with random IP in this param
orignal
that's all
orignal
example
orignal
NTCP2\00vhost=127.11.253.126;
orignal
caps=XfR;
orignal
and only NTCP2 address in FF
zzz
ok, so you think it is a real router?
orignal
I think it's thousands of real routers
orignal
coming from the same real endpoint
orignal
and my idea will work perfectly in this scenario
obscuratus
Hhhmm, sounds like something simple I could replicate on my testing network.
orignal
such moron will not be able to publish himself unless he ....
orignal
let's not simplify his life
weko
orignal: it cannot be real routers. 127.0/8 not real router
orignal
obscuratus 100%
orignal
just set any random IP to host in your confim and turn off SSU2
orignal
weko routers are real they just publish spoofed IP
orignal
how? I explained above
zzz
so what, he's running a thousand routers on one computer, say for 10 minutes, then stops them all, changes IP, restarts?
weko
orignal: but it can be one routers who just generate RIs with rundom IPs
weko
Random*
orignal
maybe on 10 computers
weko
Maybe
weko
Not 1000
orignal
zzz he didn't change IP
dr|z3d
why not validate the ntcp address published in the RI before attempting to talk to the router?
weko
This IPs actually don't run I2P routers
orignal
we had them in configs
zzz
I mean IP in the RI, not real IP
orignal
before start
orignal
I think he created many config files with different IP in it
dr|z3d
just send a packet to the port, response ? continue : ban.
orignal
and start all toghters
orignal
dr|z3d do we have such packet peer must repond to?
dr|z3d
orignal: must be something we can send that will elicit a reponse.
dr|z3d
(or not)
orignal
we don't have such message afaik
zzz
ok, interesting theory, my theory was that they were not real routers
zzz
so let's try to prove one of the theories
orignal
tell me yours
zzz
not real routers, just an attacker router spamming out netdb stores with fake RIs
dr|z3d
orignal: even just testing that the published port is open would be sufficient, without an explicit response.
orignal
zzz how does he generates fake RIs?
zzz
it would take some custom code. Your theory doesn't need any coding, so maybe it's more likely
weko
orignal: choose random IP and generate like any RI
orignal
so in your threory attacker is someone who understands i2p internals
weko
orignal: it is also possible
orignal
and then tries so dumb attack
zzz
yes. We know somebody is changing i2pd code for 20 introducers. But this would be a lot harder
zzz
I'll try the IP check and see if I catch anything
orignal
publishing fake RI is more compliated change than just one const in the code
orignal
so do you agree we should check IP?
orignal
also one clown at Ilita meantioned that he did
orignal
although I don't believe him because he is a clown
weko
[23:08:39] <9d54b3orignal> also one clown at Ilita meantioned that he did
weko
I think we should not believe him
orignal
<Boris> Ну что петушня, как я вас сегодня пошатал, понравилось?))))))))))))))))
orignal
<Boris> всего в 2к баксов обошлось) люди заинтересовалсь
orignal
weko the fact is that the attack if over
weko
For now it is
orignal
<Boris> orignal: накоплю денег, будет еще
orignal
so we can't exclude that it was really him
weko
We had 2 waves, no reasons for will not be 3td
weko
orignal: maybe we need verify
weko
Ask something about attack
orignal
also there another thoery that Boris is Plaz
dr|z3d
still some suspect ff's on the network.
orignal
weko few years ago Plaz put this irc down
orignal
by connecting from 60 destnations
weko
Boris said what he spend $2,000 for attack, and what he planned more when he get more money
orignal
and it was ElGamal
obscuratus
On my testing network, I more-or-less confirmed orignal's idea. Except the i2pd router never published as reachable. So it was just 'L' instead of 'LR'
weko
orignal: oh okay, it is maybe plaz
orignal
obscuratus nope
obscuratus
But it happily accepted a bogus IP address
orignal
set nat=false
orignal
and host to any IP
obscuratus
orignal: kk
orignal
and you will see
orignal
I know I did this in 2013 ))
weko
orignal: in any case we need try to verify Boris
orignal
what for?
weko
What he is attacker
orignal
we need to prevent future attack like this
weko
orignal: sure
orignal
remeber whole kislitsa are "attackers" like this
orignal
and is Boris = Plaz nobody would surprise
orignal
everybody knowns Plaz here ))
weko
Plaz Plaz Plaz
weko
))
zzz
do I agree we should check IP? It's worth testing, so I'll do that and see how it looks
orignal
if you see any drawbacks let me know
orignal
we need kinda brainstorming
weko
Channels topic say about 7:30 PM tomorrow)
weko
Channel*
orignal
yes, meeting
orignal
but I have some time today
dr|z3d
checking the port is open is probably sufficient to kill this type of attack dead.
orignal
they might ban you because they see connection with you already
dr|z3d
anyways, if my clownometer is anything to go by, this attack's far from done.
orignal
ofc
orignal
that's why I want to add endpoint check
weko
And we need add limit of RIs per IP per (for example) hour
orignal
how many?
weko
"How many RIs can send IP per hour"
weko
orignal: 3 for example
orignal
how many RIs can be on the same IP?
orignal
3 is too small
orignal
people might run many routers in LAN
weko
orignal: okay. One router for transit maximum, and don't calculate nontansint and nonfloofll RIs
orignal
so with published IP you mean?
dr|z3d
LAN, or shared IP on a VPN..
weko
No limit for nontransit and nonfloodfills. And limit to one transit/floodfill router
weko
orignal: yes
dr|z3d
or uni dorm.. plenty of scenarios where 1 IP can host a ton of routers.
weko
I think so
orignal
especiialy on mobile networks
orignal
and Turkmenia has one IP for whole country
weko
dr|z3d: 1 ip can host 9999 routers, but for protect tunnels we need limiting count of transiting tunnels to one per IP
weko
orignal: it is NAT
weko
We don't host many our tunnels on NAT routers
orignal
a lot
orignal
remeber first hop is connected peer
dr|z3d
~1200 banned ffs and climbing..
weko
[23:25:34] <orignal> and Turkmenia has one IP for whole country
weko
If it is, I think you cant verify one person/organization control routers in Turkmenia or it is people
dr|z3d
orignal's being facetious, weko :)
weko
And it is reason why you don't want to host your tunnels with Turkmenia IP
weko
It is just make risks for your anonymity
weko
It you can host unlimited routers on one IP, then I can just run 10k routers and start analysis
weko
If*
weko
Floodfills: 3060
weko
Again
orignal
yes I see too
weko
orignal: we can test changes if you have time
orignal
will commit SSU2 now
orignal
NTCP2 requires more work because yggdrasil
weko
Okay
orignal
I'm too old and too slow now )))
weko
It is sad
weko
TCSR decreasing
weko
Same scenario, same behavior.
obscuratus
I notice many of these bogus XfR routers have 'Compressable: true' in their router info. Another clue that it might be I2PD?
dr|z3d
more than likely. that's the russian spelling of compressible.
obscuratus
Lol, I just fat-fingered it as I transposed it here.
dr|z3d
:)
dr|z3d
them some fat fingers.
dr|z3d
just watching the clownometer keep climbing in the sidebar (aka the banned peer count)..
dr|z3d
build success currently @ 50%
dr|z3d
~2.7K banned peers now. no signs of slowing down.
dr|z3d
you see, my theory is that this may be some not very elaborate attack that dies as soon as ntcp-only ffs are blocked.
dr|z3d
so I don't see there being much downside to just banning them. low cost for us, higher cost to circumvent.
dr|z3d
I've also increased the threshold for trusting ff's from 3->8 hours.
dr|z3d
and just for good measure, L and M tier ff's no longer pass muster and are deemed slow.
dr|z3d
which reminds me, unreachable floodfills should also be discarded.
orignal
where do you see "Compressable: true"?
zzz
got the check running, caught two so far, both java floodfills
obscuratus
orignal: When I do a NetworkDB List (I'm on a java-based router FYI).
obscuratus
And the correct spelling should be: Compressible: true
orignal
so it's zzz's misspelling
orignal
and i2pd always creates compressible identity now
obscuratus
I think I'm the one who did the misspelling. :)
zzz
yeah I'm in the clear. obscuratus that's just an advanced console thing, it's not actually in the RI
dr|z3d
> my profuse apologies, orignal. :)
Xeha
dr|z3d: banning ntcp-only routers is fighting the sympton, not the cause. the attack can just publish ntcp and ssu
orignal
and ntcp2 only is valid thing
dr|z3d
valid, but rare, even more so for floodfills.
dr|z3d
it's a temporary fix, anyways, just to see how much crap gets caught.
Xeha
no its not rare, i got several FFs across the world which are ntcp only due to nasty state firewalls
Xeha
or datacenter firewalls
orignal
or UDP is blocked
dr|z3d
small price to pay. with anything from 3-15K dodgy ffs out there, I'll take the loss of a few good ones for now.
orignal
I had another suggestion for zzz long time ago
Xeha
there's a difference if you want to do it just on your routers, or push it as a whole i2p+ update
orignal
a floodfill must be on both ipv4 and ipv6
orignal
and reachable through both
Xeha
most of my FFs arent on ipv6 :(
orignal
then don't let them be a FF
dr|z3d
well, it's shipping as an update until more robust mitigations come along.
dr|z3d
and what orignal said. no actual requirement to be a floodfill.
Xeha
yea, i get the idea. you'd want floodfills to be as reachable as possible
orignal
yes for not the requirement is reachable thtough ipv4 or ipv6
orignal
I would requie both
dr|z3d
not disagreeing with you, orignal, I was saying to Xeha he doesn't _need_ to run his routers as floodfills.
orignal
ofc you don't need to run a floodfill
orignal
run a floodfill only if you can
dr|z3d
if your provider is blocking SSU, maybe not the best idea to run one.
orignal
why?
orignal
it still can work trough NTC2
dr|z3d
for the same reason you're suggesting ipv6.
dr|z3d
because ffs work perfectly fine over ipv4.
orignal
but you don't know the reason, really
orignal
because I didn't tell it yet
dr|z3d
it's a higher barrier to entry.
orignal
no. it's about OBEP and IBGW
orignal
I don't like that ipv4 is required for them
orignal
and recahble ipv4 for IBGW
dr|z3d
ok, not sure I follow, but you obviously have some logic to support your proposed ff criteria.
orignal
we must pick ipv4 routers for OBEP and IBGW for compatibility with floodfiils
dr|z3d
so you'd remove that requirement by obligating ff's to have both ipv4/6. I think we're probably near the point where that would make sense, but for now ipv6 is still is still experimental as far as uptake is concerned.
zzz
i'd tell you what % of netdb was v6 if my netdb wasn't so borked right now
zzz
very very few routers caught in the IP check so far after testing for an hour
orignal
what do you mean?
orignal
you beleive those IP are valid?
zzz
no, I just mean my stats are off
zzz
but iirc it was only like 30%
orignal
I'm talking about Ip check
obscuratus
I've thrown together a quick bash script on my testing network to generate a I2PD router with a random IP address similar to original's suggestion above.
obscuratus
Right now, I'm running it in a loop every 20 seconds (I'm not sure how quick I can go, and still contact the other FF on my testing network).
orignal
because no IP check yet
obscuratus
I can only get 'Xf' and not 'XfR', but if needed, I can probably make a patched I2PD router.
orignal
I'm doing the code right now
zzz
I screwed up the ygg check, trying again
orignal
Xf vs XfR
orignal
I can tell you why
obscuratus
So, I'll be able to test mitigations on my testing network if anybody wants.
orignal
because you are running trunk
orignal
that guys probably run release
orignal
and yes good finding about R
zzz
also seen case where the low-end of the IPv6 is different (temporary addresses)
obscuratus
orignal: Yeah, I build from git.
zzz
so might need to only check first 8 of ipv6
orignal
I have chaged that logic recdently
orignal
zzz, please explain why it should be different?
orignal
you report their address in SessionCreated
orignal
current one
eyedeekay
Is major down?
zzz
orignal, ipv6 temporary addresses
orignal
maybe
obscuratus
eyedeekay: Lot's of bogus FF's right now, so you may just be having trouble getting to it.
orignal
yes but why it should be different?
orignal
between SessionCreated and SessionConfirmed
orignal
even if it's tempopartu
eyedeekay
Yeah I'm seeing that, trying to get caught up on what's going on
orignal
*temporary
zzz
it takes a while to 'find out' your ipv6 changed
orignal
how?
orignal
if new address comed in SessionCreated
zzz
yeah but we don't rebuild a new RI between session created and session confirmed
zzz
example:
zzz
net.i2p.data.DataFormatException: IP mismatch actual IP 2001:470:28:365:216:3eff:fedd:2fa1 in RI: [RouterInfo:
zzz
[host] = [2001:470:28:365:0:0:0:38]
orignal
so how many bytes should we compare?
zzz
8
orignal
thanks
zzz
so far none of the traps I've set have really yielded much