@eyedeekay
&eche|on
&zzz
+Irc2PGuest3601
+R4SAS
+RN
+StormyCloud
+cumlord
+dr|z3d
+eche|off
+mareki2p
+not_bob_afk
+orignal
+postman
+qend-irc2p
Arch2
Birdy
BubbRubb
Chrono
Dann
DeltaOreo
Irc2PGuest18689
Irc2PGuest2010
Irc2PGuest20149
Irc2PGuest57895
Irc2PGuest74254
Irc2PGuest95708
Irc2PGuest98006
Onn4l7h
Onn4|7h
Over1
Sisyphus
Sleepy
SlippyJoe
Stormycl1
T3s|4__
Teeed
aargh2
ac9f_
acetone_
anontor
b3t4f4c3__
dr4wd3
duanin2
duck
eyedeekay_bnc
gelleger1
leopold_
makoto
matean
n1_
nilbog-
onon_
poriori
profetikla
r00tobo_BNC
rapidash
shiver_
solidx66
thetia
u5657
uop23ip
w8rabbit
x74a6
xHarr
orignal
2.9.0 e.g. major release?
orignal
when?
zzz
<eyedeekay> mid-late may then?
zzz
<orignal> fine for me
dr|z3d
*** smiles. ***
dr|z3d
stay off the crack, orignal, it's making you forgetful! :)
EKCKABATOR54
Hello, zzz. I've been thinking a bit about congestion control in i2p. The main thing that worries me, and what prevents me from moving on to testing the effectiveness of specific algorithms, is the probability of opening attacks aimed at deanonymization due to an incorrectly chosen CC algorithm. Do you have any thoughts on this? I've skimmed through several articles from Tor about CC and I got the impre
EKCKABATOR54
d to be a more dangerous class of algorithms, although personally I don't understand why this does not apply to delay-based algorithms to the same extent.
zzz
Not familiar with the papers, your threat model, or where you're poking around, so can't offer any advice
zzz
eyedeekay, you're doing the website, right?