+R4SAS
+RN_
+T3s|4
+acetone
+nyaa2pguy
+orignal
+postman
+qend-irc2p
+wodencafe
Daddy_I2P
Irc2PGuest33728
Irc2PGuest35412
NiceBoat
Onn4l7h
Over
Sisyphus
T3s|4_
Teeed
Zapek
aargh4
ahiru
ananas
b3t4f4c3___
duanin2
marek
mareki2p_
n2_
not_bob_afk2
o3d3
poriori
profetikla
r00tobo
sahil
solidx66
uop23ip
urist_
x74a6
zelgomer
orignal
2.9.0 e.g. major release?
orignal
when?
zzz
<eyedeekay> mid-late may then?
zzz
<orignal> fine for me
dr|z3d
*** smiles. ***
dr|z3d
stay off the crack, orignal, it's making you forgetful! :)
EKCKABATOR54
Hello, zzz. I've been thinking a bit about congestion control in i2p. The main thing that worries me, and what prevents me from moving on to testing the effectiveness of specific algorithms, is the probability of opening attacks aimed at deanonymization due to an incorrectly chosen CC algorithm. Do you have any thoughts on this? I've skimmed through several articles from Tor about CC and I got the impre
EKCKABATOR54
d to be a more dangerous class of algorithms, although personally I don't understand why this does not apply to delay-based algorithms to the same extent.
zzz
Not familiar with the papers, your threat model, or where you're poking around, so can't offer any advice
zzz
eyedeekay, you're doing the website, right?