&zzz
+R4SAS
+RN_
+eche|off
+nilbog
+orignal
+postman
+qend-irc2p
+sourceress
Arch
Birdy
Irc2PGuest30010
Irc2PGuest36077
Irc2PGuest49364
Irc2PGuest51117
Irc2PGuest6564
Irc2PGuest65656
Irc2PGuest67278
Irc2PGuest74235
Irc2PGuest83482
MatrixBot
Onn4l7h
Over
Sleepy
Teeed
Yotsu
aargh3
ac9f
acetone_
ahiru
anontor
b3t4f4c3__
bob___
cims
dr4wd3_
dr|z3d
duanin2
f00b4r
hababam_
hagen_
leopold
makoto
marek
marek22k
n2
noidea
not_bob_afk
nyaa2pguy
o3d3_
poriori
profetikla
r00tobo
rapidash
solidx66
stormycloud[m]
test7363673
uop23ip
urist_
user_
w8rabbit
zelgomer
orignal
2.9.0 e.g. major release?
orignal
when?
zzz
<eyedeekay> mid-late may then?
zzz
<orignal> fine for me
dr|z3d
*** smiles. ***
dr|z3d
stay off the crack, orignal, it's making you forgetful! :)
EKCKABATOR54
Hello, zzz. I've been thinking a bit about congestion control in i2p. The main thing that worries me, and what prevents me from moving on to testing the effectiveness of specific algorithms, is the probability of opening attacks aimed at deanonymization due to an incorrectly chosen CC algorithm. Do you have any thoughts on this? I've skimmed through several articles from Tor about CC and I got the impre
EKCKABATOR54
d to be a more dangerous class of algorithms, although personally I don't understand why this does not apply to delay-based algorithms to the same extent.
zzz
Not familiar with the papers, your threat model, or where you're poking around, so can't offer any advice
zzz
eyedeekay, you're doing the website, right?