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SilicaRice
what prevents someone from leaking an encrypted LS?
dr|z3d
SilicaRice: nothing.
dr|z3d
what prevents someone from leaking a private ssh key?
SilicaRice
ohh
SilicaRice
so a combination of "friendship keys" (revokable per-client destination) with encrypted LS (revokable per-client leaseset) would be the ideal DDoS protection then, on the assumption that all clients are known?
dr|z3d
depends on your threat model. "ideal" is a movable feast.
SilicaRice
a malicious client could leak the leaseset, at which point you just nuke the destination. all the other clients would still be able to connect normally but any DDoSers wouldn't.